二大一廣場／朱立倫的美國大挑戰

文／方恩格 （Ross Darrell Feingold）

近日，朱立倫宣布參選國民黨黨主席，並強調他若當選，他將於今年年底前訪美，並在華府重新設立國民黨代表處，這讓江啟臣陣營也趕緊解釋為何他還未實現當選時所說「將在華盛頓特區重新設立代表處」的承諾。

然而，若朱訪美真的成行、或者無論誰當選下一任國民黨主席、開設了新的國民黨代表處，並且就算得到拜登政府、國會議員、智庫、學者或美國媒體的加持，也不會跨海影響到台灣2022年的地方選舉選情。增加公開對美出訪機會或許可能對於國民黨在美國對台相關利益者（key stakeholders）眼中的形象加分，但同時也更有可能發生口誤或失言機會而將情勢弄巧成拙，讓他們裡子面子兼失。

▲朱立倫7月時發文表示「反對台獨，堅守中華民國立場，深化台美關係」（圖／翻攝自朱立倫臉書）

根據筆者觀察，美國政府對於國民黨主席人選並無偏好設定。即使美國近來干涉他國選舉案例層出不窮，其中也並不一定對美國的目標政策或相關國家當地的政治穩定產生正面的成果。就算美國真的要出手干預外國的選舉，通常也會是該地的總統或國會大選，而不會是特定政黨內部的選舉。無論是什麼選舉，台灣人民都應該睜大雙眼、積極監督、抵抗任何外國勢力企圖干預這些選舉的可能。

然而美國近期對於台灣選舉確實具有影響力，導致台灣總統參選人在大選前開始前仆後繼訪美，若能得到美國爸爸的公開認可，便勝券在握。

在2011年時執政的歐巴馬幕僚匿名批評蔡英文訪問美國，這對於當時蔡的選情造成了很大的傷害。後來為了2016年1月的總統大選，蔡再度於2015年6月訪美，比起前次，這次她受到了更多的歡迎與呼聲，然後順利當選。

2015年11月，朱立倫在換柱風波之下被徵召出任國民黨總統候選人，在新加坡舉行的「馬習會」會後一周內，朱便動身訪美。這意味著短短幾天內，美國政壇在台灣議題上已經注入諸多時間與精力。當時民進黨在大選中呼聲較高，而歐巴馬政府正處於跛腳期，沒有理由插手台灣的選舉。所以朱這趟訪美除了為台灣媒體提供了幾個他匆匆進入美國政府辦公室的揮手畫面之外，對他的選情沒有帶來任何幫助。反觀在2020年總統大選時，鑒於蔡政府與川普政府的良好關係，韓國瑜在選前並未訪美似乎是一個正確的決定。

▲朱立倫2015年11月時曾經訪美，還與時任美國副國務卿布林肯會面（圖／翻攝自黃裕鈞臉書）

事實上，極少有外國政黨會在美國設立政黨代表處。通常外國政黨對美的聯繫窗口已經有美國駐該國的大使館（以台灣而言是美國在台協會），此外，一個辦公室要能維持基本運作，需要大筆資金注入，就算硬體搞定，要派出一個適當的黨代表人選更是一門學問。而一般情況下，政黨要角定期對美訪問與交流可以達到特定成效，並不需要特別設立一個駐美政黨代表處。

另一個重要考量是，對於華府的一些主要利益相關者而言，他們通常會把外國在野政黨在美設立代表處的目的，視為尋求美國支持他們推翻該國執政政府的反對勢力。

美國司法部的資料顯示，只有少數的外國政黨在美國登記代表處以開展該黨的宣傳工作，其中包括了歐盟議會內的歐洲人民黨、衣索比亞、迦納、伊朗、伊拉克、奈及利亞、突尼西亞、和土耳其等國的反對黨及印度的執政黨等，此外，也有加拿大執政的自由黨，考慮到美加雙邊關係以及居住在美國的眾多加拿大國民，這個政黨代表處設得很有道理。這之中也包括了在美國設有代表處超過25年的台灣民進黨。

如果國民黨認真考量要在美設立政黨代表處，並且有比「民進黨在當地有辦公室、所以我們也要」更有建設性的理由，筆者樂意在此分享在美設立一個政黨辦公室的三個成功要件供之參考（3P：People, Policy, Process，人、政策、與程序）：

【人】：

美台關係目前最重要的議題在於區域安全合作與武器銷售。國民黨駐美代表若要想得到美國的重視，此人選不能只是當過兵，而必須具備豐厚的國防知識與實際軍事經驗，否則不可能成為一個好的溝通橋樑，此外，這個人選必須身家清白、沒有醜聞，並且與中國沒有任何曖昧的往來紀錄。這個人除了必須能成熟處理來自外界的檢視與批評之外，還要能夠抵抗可能來自國民黨自己內部的批評聲浪。

【政策】：

國民黨必須推出對美相關政策，並透由國民黨駐美代表來向美國利益相關者闡明這些政策。身為在野黨，國民黨在對中關係、美國對台軍售、美豬進口、核電等諸多議題上，抱持著與執政政府分歧的聲量情有可原，但從2014年的地方選舉開始，直到2016年、2020年總統和立法委員選舉，清楚闡明自己的政策一直是國民黨的弱項，他們必須在這上面多加強琢磨。

【程序】：

不可低估成立一個駐外代表處的程序之重要性。程序包含了明確界定此代表的工作範圍與權限，如果他的工作還包括募款、鼓勵在美的台灣選民回鄉投票給國民黨等，那麼這位代表也必須具備相關技能等從政經驗。同時他與黨主席之間的關係也很重要，他們必須要能直接對話，而非通過黨內人士等層層架構。

無論下任國民黨黨主席是誰、國民黨在台灣的選情如何、或國民黨與美國的關係將如何發展，這些都不會取決於國民黨主席到過美國訪問幾次、或者他在美國重新設了幾個政黨代表處，而是將取決於國民黨做了什麼、推出了什麼亮眼的政策、讓台灣選民如何看待他們。套句美國俗話：「所有政治都是地方性的（all politics is local）」，國民黨的未來，並不會取決於他們在美國做了什麼動作。

《作者簡介》方恩格，美國紐約執業律師，前任美國共和黨海外部亞太地區主席，長期觀察臺灣政經的國際趨勢專家。

以下為英文版本原文

《Kuomintang’s American Challenge》

By Ross Darrell Feingold

Former Asia Chairman, Republicans Abroad

Recently Kuomintang chairman candidate Eric Chu, after announcing his intention to compete in the party chairman election has emphasized that if elected, he will re-establish a Kuomintang office in Washington DC, and also visit the United States by the end of this year. Johnny Chiang’s camp has also made an effort in recent days to explain why the Kuomintang has not already opened a Washington DC office.

A US visit, and a representative office, is unlikely to result in the Biden Administration, Members of Congress, think tanks and scholars, or United States media providing any assistance to the Kuomintang’s chance of electoral success in the 2022 local elections of the 2022 presidential and parliamentary elections. However, a poorly executed visit or poorly planned office has the risk of significantly damaging the Kuomintang’s image with key stakeholders in the United States.

There is no reason to believe that the United States government has a preference for who wins the Kuomintang chairman election. The United States has more than enough recent experience with interfering in elections in other countries, and this does not always result in a positive outcome for United States policy goals or the relevant country’s political stability. Regardless, if the United States is to interfere in a foreign election, it is typically national elections rather than a political party internal leadership election. Whether a political office election, or internal election for the Kuomintang, Democratic Progressive Party, or other political party in Taiwan, people in Taiwan should adamantly reject any actions or statements by foreign governments that seek to influence an internal political party election.

There is unfortunately a recent history of United States interference in Taiwan elections, and with Taiwan politicians seeking the United States “stamp of approval” when running for president. In 2011, an official of the then governing Obama Administration anonymously criticized Tsai Ing-wen when she visited the United States, which was detrimental to her presidential election chances. Tsai’s visit to Washington DC in June 2015 in advance of the January 2016 presidential election went much better.

Chu visited the United States in November 2015, after he replaced Hung Hsiu-chu as the Kuomintang’s presidential candidate. This visit came days after the Ma-Xi meeting in Singapore, which means United States policy makers had probably reached their quota for the amount of time they wished to spend on Taiwan-China issues that week. In addition, the Democratic Progressive Party’s likelihood of election victory was already all but assured, and the Obama Administration was in its lame duck period with little incentive to criticize Tsai or support Chu. The visit did provide voters in Taiwan a few video clips of Chu hurrying into, or exiting, meetings at United States government offices in Washington DC, but resulted in no benefit for his doomed presidential campaign. Han Kuo-yu did not visit the United States in the final months of the 2020 presidential election campaign, which in this author’s view was a correct decision given the strength of the Taiwan government’s relationship with the Trump Administration.

The reality is few foreign political parties have representative offices in the United States. The reasons for this include that the usual contact windows for foreign political parties are United States embassies (or in the case of Taiwan, the American Institute in Taiwan), a significant financial expense is necessary for the office to be effective, difficulty in selecting the right representative, and that it is sufficient for a foreign politician to periodically visit the United States without the need to have a party representative office.

Another significant issue is that for some key stakeholders in Washington DC, the perception is that a foreign political party office, especially one in opposition, exists for purposes of gaining United States support to remove their country’s government. According to the Department of Justice’s registration website, only a small number of foreign political parties are registered as conducting advocacy work in the United States. This includes Canada’s governing Liberal Party, which is understandable given the importance of the bilateral relationship and the large number of Canadians who reside in the United States, and Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party’s which has had an office in the United States for over 25 years. Others include ruling or opposition parties from the European Union parliament, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Tunisia, and Turkey.

There needs to be a significant reason for the Kuomintang to re-establish a Washington DC office other than simply because the Democratic Progressive Party has an office. In this author’s opinion, for a US office to be successful, the Kuomintang will need to focus on Three P’s: People, Policy, Process.

By far the most significant issue in US-Taiwan relations is security cooperation and weapons sales. The Kuomintang’s representative to the United States, in order to be taken seriously by Biden Administration, Members of Congress, as well as think tanks and scholars, must have significant military experience beyond simply having served the minimum national service. A representative with no military experience would be a non-starter. The representative must be free from scandal, have no compromising relations to China, and the maturity to deal with the inevitable criticisms of their activities that will come from either Taiwan, Taiwan government friendly persons and organizations in the United States, the media, or even from critics within the Kuomintang.

Secondly, the Kuomintang must have policies on issues relevant to the United States, and the Kuomintang’s representative to the United States must be able to articulate these policies to American stakeholders. If the Kuomintang really is a loyal opposition, it is understandable that it disagrees with the Tsai Administration on various issues whether China relations, the purchase or cost of weapons sold to Taiwan by the United States, importing into Taiwan pork from the United States that contains ractopamine, or the use of nuclear power. Starting from the 2014 local election and including the 2016 and 2020 presidential and legislative elections, the Kuomintang has struggled to articulate its policies both domestically and internationally.

Finally, the importance of process cannot be underestimated. This includes clearly defining the work scope and lines of authority. If the representative is also responsible for fund raising and encouraging eligible voters to return to Taiwan to vote for the Kuomintang, then the representative must have relevant skills. The ability to speak directly with the party chairman, without the need to first pass through layers of party bureaucracy, is also important.

Ultimately though, the next party chairman’s domestic political success, or management of relations with the United States, will not depend on his visits to the United States or whether there is a representative office in the United States. It will depend on how Taiwan’s voters view the Kuomintang’s policies. As the saying in the United States goes, “all politics is local”.